 |
 |
In
the midst
of every
political domain,
all sectors
in the
country thrive
to be
on the
political agenda
of lawmakers.
When it
comes to
that, sugar
producers are
among the top sectors that influence
lawmakers in the United States.
It has been a tradition for
the United States to protect
the sugar producers since the
times
of the great Depression.
In
his article, Virata, an economist
who have looked closely at
sugar
protection stated that, “when
the great depression occurred
in the 1930s, there was greater
surplus of sugar and this would
have caused lower sugar prices;
to protect the sugar growers,
the Congress acted to put some
sort of price floor on sugar
prices.” Since then, the article
claimed that sugar producers
have remained hooked and dependent
on government support. Debate
over whether to protect United
States sugar producers or to
allow free trade are rare;
most
trade agreements exclude sugar
or have special arrangements for sugar as evidenced by NAFTA. Sugar lobbyists make sure that
potential debates to eliminate
sugar protection do not even
reach the floor for debate
most
of the times.
Representatives
with constituents that grow
sugar as their primary means
of living can easily kiss their
jobs goodbye if they do not
protect the interest of their
constituents.
Simply put, politicians from
areas like Florida, Texas,
Louisiana,
and the Mid-West, where most
of sugar is produced are keen
on what they say or do in Washington
about sugar. When it comes
to
protecting this crying baby
industry, U.S government has
used different methods. The
methods of choice are usually
subsidies, quotas,
and tariffs. This research will
explain U.S sugar policies and the implications of such actions.
The research focuses on subsidies
or price support loan programs
and tariff-rate quotas, and
how the uses of such determine
sugar prices in the U.S. sugar
market.
Part
II. Theory
development
|
There
are number
of market
related
issues
that
are of
concern to
the U.S
government
which prompt
them
to interfere with
the market
systems
in the
sugar
industry
and any
other
market
sector. Among
these
issues
is the lack
of balance
between producers
and consumers needs.
This
issue
simply state
that,
if consumers were
solely
allowed
to set
prices,
they
would
act in
a self-centered
way. If
that
was the
case,
then
producers
would
not make enough
profit
and could potentially result
in them
stopping production.
On the
other hand,
if producers
were allowed
to solely
decide on how
much
sugar
would
cost,
they
would
act in
their
on self-interest.
If that
was the
case,
then
consumers
will
be overcharged
and exploited.
So, the
United State
government
acts
as the
mediator
of trade activities
to set
a fair playing
field
for both consumers
and the producers
in industries such
as the
sugar.
The primary
reason
why the
government
subsidizes
domestic
producers,
taxes
imports,
or puts
quotas on
incoming
products
from
other
countries
is to
be able
to influence
supply
and demand
of a
particular
product.
Having
influenced
supply and
demand,
there
will either
be an
inward
or outward
shift
in the supply
or the
demand
curves
of a
particular product.
There
are universal economic
laws
that
deal with
supply
and demand;
these
are referred to
as the law of
supply
or the
law of
demand.
The law
of supply
is the
positive
relationship between
price
and quantity
supplied, when
all other
factors
that
influence
supply are
held
constant.
The law
of demand
states that,
there
is an inverse
relationship between
the price
of a
good
and the
quantity demanded,
when
all other
factors
that influence
demand
are held
constant.
Since
there
is an
inverse
relationship
between
price
and quantity
demanded,
it will
be a
good
policy
for a
government
if it
intends
to help
domestic
producers,
to make
goods coming
into
the country
more
expensive
than
the domestic
goods. This
will
make
buyers
prefer
domestic
goods
over
the imported goods.
Subsidizing producers
to lower their
burden
in costs
of production
is one
way domestic governments
work
to bring
domestic producers’
costs down
and encourage
them to even
increase production
levels which
in returns
will
lower
domestic
prices
due to higher supplies;
it is a
vicious
cycle
that
never
ends.
Likewise,
since
there
is a
positive
relationship
between
price
and quantity
supplied,
producers will
not produce more
of a
product if
the prices
are below
expectation. To
keep
prices up
and thus
make producers
continue with
production,
the government
must
support
a price
floor.
This
price
floor
comes
in many
forms,
which
subsidies
and quotas
are among
them.
Having
seen
that
analysis,
it is
much
easier
to see
whom
the subsidies
help
and whom
they
hurt
in an
economy.
Subsidies
and quotas
in the
sugar
industry
were
designed
to help
producers
in general.
These
quotas
and subsidies
or support
programs
as they
are often
referred
to in
the sugar
industry,
increase
producer’s
surplus.
Those
who are
left
out of
the loop
are the
domestic
consumers;
quotas
and the
implementation of the
sugar
programs
reduce
their
surplus,
these
programs only
leave
consumers
with
the limited
choice
of buying
from
domestic
producers.
Consumers
suffer
in terms
of paying
higher
prices
when
there
is no
competition
in the
market.
When
government
wants
to help
consumers
over
the producers,
it will
institute
a price
ceiling
instead
of a
price
floor.
There
is another
group
that
suffers
because
of subsidies
and quotas;
this
group
is made
up of
the producers
in other
countries
who are
not subsidized
by their
governments.
Most
often,
it is
the third
world
countries
that
do not
have
preferential
treatment
from
developed
nations
such
as the
United
States,
European Union,
Japan
and many
others.
Underdeveloped
nations
such
as Sudan,
Mauritania
and many
other
sub-Sahara
countries of Africa,
and poor
countries
of Asia
suffer
the consequences
of subsidization
and other
form
of trade barriers
instituted
by the
wealthy
nations
the most.
The next
question
that
ought
to be
asked
is why
does a
government
want
to influence
supply
and demand
for a
particular
product?
Or in
other
words,
why does
a particular
government
support
trade
barriers,
in this
case
the U.S
government
even
though
it is
aware
of the
consequences of such
action? Below
are some
of the
reasons
as to
why governments
take
such
actions.
• For
U.S Public
interest/
national
defense
• Protect
U.S producers
• Heavy
political
lobbying
by Sugar
producers
• Protect
jobs
in the
U.S
• To
avoid
dumping
from
other
countries
The reasons
provided
above
are serious
issues,
which
need
to be
addressed
with
carefulness by
the U.S
government
or else
risk
getting
into
many
other
problems
related
to market
economy.
To reiterate
the seriousness
of failing
to do
something
about
regulating
the inflow
and outflow
of goods
within
United
States,
consider
this example,
“cuts
in U.S.
sugar
import
quotas,
as predicted,
were
about
to force
the closing of
a local
sugar mill,
which
in turn
would
cause
newly
unemployed
workers
to grow
marijuana,” claimed
Alas
in his
article.
Although
this is
an extreme
prediction,
there
is no
doubt
that
those
who have
lost
jobs
because
of lower
profitability
of sugar
after
reduction
in quotas
must
do something.
The scenario
highlighted
above
threatens
United
States’
security
by encouraging
and opening
up drugs
market,
which
could potentially
lead
to increase
in crime rates.
As seen
above,
there
are positive
results
to be
reaped
by domestic
producers and
citizens
in general
in terms
of public
interest/
national
defense.
However,
let us
not lose
sight
over
the damages
caused
by such
actions.
Imposing quotas
or restricting
imports
from
allies
in order
to protect domestic
producers
can leads
to loosing
those
allies
to an
enemy
such
as the
former Soviet
Union
during
cold
war or
currently
it will
lead
to retaliations.
The conventional
argument
has been
that,
protecting
domestic
producers
in the sugar
industry
was to
protect
American
jobs.
However,
careful research
have
found
otherwise;
in the
article
by Dorning,
it is
reported
that
an “artificially high
sugar
price
caused
by limits
on imports
was "a
major
factor" in
the loss
of 10,000
jobs
as U.S.
candy
makers
shift
production
overseas
to take
advantage of
lower
sugar
prices”.
The Commerce
Department
concluded
as Dorning
claimed,
“For every
job protected
in sugar
cultivation,
three
jobs
were
lost
in food
production.”
Since
the market
for sugar
and in
most
cases
all agricultural
products
is very
competitive,
domestic
governments
must act
accordingly
to save
their
own producers
from
this
competition
by regulating
trade.
In the article
by Swerling,
the market
structure
of the
sugar
industry
is explained
to be
a competitive
one between
the developed
and the
less-developed nations.
H wever,
there
is one
area
where
the less-developed
nations
cannot
compete:
and this
is subsidizing
sugar
or any
other agricultural
product
growers
or other
domestic
producers.
The wealthy
nations
can afford
to subsidize
their
farmers
and even
their
suppliers
from
abroad
through
preferential trade
arrangements.
United
States
uses
many
aspects
of trade
barriers
such
as quotas,
direct
subsidies,
and tariffs to
support
its domestic
sugar
producers.
Heavy
lobbying
from
sugar
growers
and cane sugar
factories
has help
to shape
legislation
favoring
sugar
subsidies
(Swerling
pg. 351).
The lobbying
has survived
because
of the
power it has
gather
by putting
their
strengths
together
and fund
the lobbying efforts
to influence
law makers
in order
to implement
policies
that
help
sugar
farmers
and prevent
potential
harm
that
could
come
their way
if prices
were
artificially
lower
than
anticipated.
It is
without
doubt
that
United
States
acts
to stabilize
prices
here
at home
by giving
subsidies and
imposing
tariff-rate
quotas
on incoming
sugar
from
other
countries
such
as Brazil.
In doing
so, the
United
States’ sugar
farmers
avoid
competition
from
the outside
world.
Many
under-developed
nations
have complained
that
this
avoidance
of competition
by wealthy
or developed
nations
hurts
their
economies.
Underdeveloped countries’
comparative
advantage is in
the cheap
labor
that goes
into
the production
of goods
such
as sugar.
If a nation
like
United
States
subsidizes
and impose
tariff-rate
quotas
on their
sugar,
then the
under-developed
countries’
abundant
and cheap
labor
will
not mean
much
in the
world
market.
Although
Economic
analysis
has shown
over
and over
again
that
there
is a
gain
to be
made
when
countries trade,
many
governments
decide
to protect
some
of their
industry
such
as the
sugar
industry
in United
States
despite
the fundamental
believe
that free
trade
is good.
Sugar
domestic
farmers
in the
United
States
or producers
in general
would
want
to make
the public
and the
lawmakers
believe
that
trade globalization
is a
threat
to local
economy.
In this
regard,
domestic farmers
are acting in a
self-interest
manner.
Governments
claim
to correct
market
failures
when
they
act in
these
protective
ways,
when
in economic
reality
they
are not.
A market
failure occurs
when
inefficiency
is perceived
to be
particularly
dramatic, or
when
it is
suggested
that
non-market
institutions
such
as the
government
would
be more
efficient
and wealth
producing
than
their
private
alternatives.
In the
section
that
will
follow,
I will
discuss
the structure of United
State
sugar
policy
and give
some
of the
implications
that
arise when
such
policies are
implemented.
Part
III. Analyzing the policy
|
For
the
analysis
of
this
paper,
sugar
shall
refer
to
all
processed sugar
regardless
of
the
source since
sugar
is
a very
broad
term
used
to
capture
all
processed sugar
whether
it
was
processed from
sugar
beets,
cane,
or
other sources. I
will
use
the
term
sugar to
refer
to
all
processed
sugar that
is
in
the
final
state. Sugar
is first
processed
before
it
is
traded
in
most
cases
because
it
is
highly
perishable.
The
United
States
is
the
largest
consumer
of
sweeteners,
including
high
fructose
corn
syrup,
and
is
one
of
the
largest
global
sugar
importers.
The
United
States
ranks
among
the
top
sugar
producers,
and
is
one
of
the
few
countries
with
significant
production of
both
sugar
beets
and
sugarcane
(USDA).
Subsidization
or
support
of
sugar
is
not
only
administered in
the
U.S
alone,
but
rather
are
administered
all across
the board
for
most
industrialized
nations.
Subsidies
supporting agriculture
producers
are
significant
and
widespread. WTO
members
report
subsidies
totaling
more
than
$221
billion
per
year
on
average.
For
the
interest
of
time
and
resources, I
will
only
look
at United
States’
sugar
industry
and how
their policies
are
implemented.
The
analysis
will
often
touch
on
how
the
implementation of
such
policies
affected other
countries
and
what
can
be
their
potential
reaction.
The
main
focus
of
the
U.S
sugar
policy
has
been
to
regulate
supply
of
sugar
in
the
country,
so
as
to
keep
the
prices
up
enough
for
sugar
farmers
and
still
maintain
sugar
demand.
Sugar
industry has
remained
a protected infant
industry
for
many,
many
years
as
stated
earlier
and
also
because
of
its dynamic market.
There
are
number
of
things
that
have
kept
this
industry
highly
protected
in
the
United
States:
national
security,
protecting producers
ensuring
that jobs
are
kept
in
the
U.S,
high
lobbying
effort
by
sugar
growers,
and
preventing
dumping
from
other
countries.
Although all
of
the
reasons
provided above
have
help
to
keep the
industry
protected, the
driving force
behind the
protection
wheel
is
the
sugar
growers’
ability
to
control powerful
politicians
in
the
country.
To
analyze
the
structure
of
the
U.S
sugar
policy,
there are
number
of
aspects
that
will
be
discussed.
Supply
and
demand
of
sugar
in
the
United
States, sugar
price
levels
in
the
United States
and
the
world, and
comparative
advantage
of U.S
sugar
growers
in
the
world
sugar
market.
Supply
and
demand
is
such
a central
issue
at
the
heart
of
U.S
sugar
policy.
Taking
one
at
a time,
let’s
analyze
supply.
Determinants of
supply
in
general
are:
availability
of
resources,
technology, and
the
number
of
sellers, and
governments’
actions
such
as
subsidization, taxing
imports
or
imposing quotas.
On
the
suppliers’
side,
government’s
action
such
as price support
programs
and tariff-rate
quotas
help
sugar
producers.
Those
actions
guarantee a
certain
price
and the
U.S
government acts
as
the
insurance
to
such
price
floor using
indirect
subsidies.
Economic
theory
tells us
that
since
the
prices
are
guaranteed,
all
else
equal,
suppliers will
produce
more
therefore
leading
to a
production
surplus.
However,
since
the
price is
guaranteed, sugar
growers’
surplus
will
not
be allowed by
the
government
to
hit
the
market, as
this
will
tend
to
reduce
prices. To
keep
the
surplus
out
of
the
market,
the
U.S government
must
come
up with
ways
to
get
rid
of
the entire
surplus
at
the
prevailing
price.
One
way
of
doing that
is
to
make
sugar processors
pay
their
loan
with
sugar
instead
of
money if
the
prices
are
low.
United
States
sugar
farmers
will repay
their
debt
to
the
government
using
sugar
if
their
sugar
happens
not
to
sell
at
the
guaranteed
price.
Traditionally,
subsidization
would
result
in
lowering
price,
but
since
surplus
is
not
allowed
to
go
to
the
market,
prices
would
remain
the same,
giving
suppliers’
unequivocal
advantage
over
consumers.
The
form
of
subsidy
used
in
the
sugar
industry
is
very
different
from
the
one
use in
other
agricultural
products.
This
is
very precisely
described
in
the
farm
bill
of
2002
referred
to
as
the
(2002
Farm
Act).
The
subsidy
is
not
given
directly to
farmers
in
terms
of
money;
rather
it
is
given
to
sugar
processors
in
terms
of
low
rate loans.
U.S
department
of
Agriculture
give
these
loans
to
processors
with
the
promise
that
they
(sugar processors)
will
pay
a reasonable
price
that
is
proportional
to
the
amount
of
loans
received to the
farmers.
To
ensure
that
the
processors
do
not
exploit
sugar
farmers,
the
U.S
department of
agriculture
maintains
the authority
to
set
the
minimum
producer
payment.
This
authority
is
used
to
keep
the
sugar
prices
up
at
level
deemed profitable
to
the
farmers.
They
can
easily
put
together
a tabulation
of
how
high
the prices
ought
to
be
and
then
implement the
policy
that
will
make
them
achieve
their
goal.
The
USDA
is
very
careful
in
implementing
the
sugar
support
programs because
it
is
well
outlined
in
the
farm
act
that
failure
of
the
system
will
allow
farmers
to
repay
their
loans
in
sugar.
However,
sugar
repayment
is
the
last
thing
the
government
need,
as
this
will
increase
the
already
swaggering
deficits
levels.
The
Theoretical
analysis
of
the
|
before
the
subsidy,
B
represents
suppliers’
surplus
before
the
subsidy.
After
the
subsidy, if
the
price
was
not
controlled,
the
price
would
fall
to
P2
and
the
consumers’
surplus would
include
A,
B,
C,
D
and
the
supplier
Area
A
represents
the
consumers’
surplus
before the
subsidy,
B
represents
suppliers’
surplus
before
the subsidy. After
the
subsidy,
if
the
price
was
not
controlled,
the
price
would
fall
to
P2
and
the
consumers’ surplus
would
include
A,
B,
C,
D
and
the
supplier
surplus
will
be
the
area
covered
by
E
and
F.
To
ensure
that
the prices
of
sugar
do
not
fall
to
P2,
the
government must
do
something
with
surplus
captured
by
area
C
and D.
The sugar
support
program
would
make
it
possible
for
the
processors
to
give
this
surplus
to
the
government
in
return
for
the
loan.
The
forfeiture
of
the
processed
sugar
that
would
have
acted
as
the
surplus
eliminates
any
possibility and
hope of
price
falling.
Below
is
the
theoretical
analysis
that
shows
graphically
how the
tariff-rate
quota
system
operates
in
sugar
industr
|
The
areas
covered
by
A,
B,
C and
D would
be
the
consumers’
surplus
before
the
tariffrate
quota
was
applied.
Once
the
tariff-rate
quota
is
applied,
supply
will
shift
to
the
left
causing
high-rise
in
prices
to
P2.
These
high
prices
will
result
in
the
reduction
of
consumers’
surplus
to
represent
only
area
A and
the
area
B will
represent
the
suppliers’
surplus.
The
government
would
make
revenue
represented
by triangle
C and
D.
The
revenue
made
by
the
government
through
the
tariff-rate
quota program
does
not
find
it
way
to
the
consumers
but
rather
to
the
producers
for
more
support
programs,
making
consumers
the
net
losers
and
the
producers
the
net
gainers.
The
2002
Farm
Act
requires
USDA
to
operate
the
U.S.
sugar
loan
program
at
no
cost
to
the
Federal
Government.
This
provision
means
that
USDA
must
operate
the
program
in
a manner
that
keeps
price
high
in
order
to
avoid
the
forfeiture
of
sugar
to
the
government
as
loan
repayment.
In
order to discourage
forfeiture
of
loans,
the
sugar
price
at
the
time
of loan
repayment
must
be
high
enough
to
cover
the
loan
principal
plus
interest
expenses
and
other
costs
incurred
by
sugar
producers.
Another
way
the
U.S
government
protects
their
sugar
farmers
is
by
preventing
foreign
sugar
or
control
the
amount
of
sugar
that
enters
the
United
States’
sugar
market.
This
method
of
putting
a quantitative
limit
on
foreign
sugar
is
referred
to
as
quota.
Quotas
unlike
subsidies
keep
prices
up
and
allow
suppliers
to charge astronomical
prices,
and
since
consumers
have
no
other
choice,
they will
pay the
charging
price.
However,
unlike
regular
quotas,
sugar
industry
quotas
are
mixed
with
tariffs.
In
other
words,
tariffs
come
along
with
the
quantitative
limit
on
sugar
and
if
a country
goes
over
the
prescribed
limit,
their
tariff
rate
will
be
increased
and
this
will
discourage
them
from
importing
more
sugar
to
the
U.S
because
then
at
the
going
tariff
rate,
they
will
not
be
profitable.
In the sugar
industry,
this
policy
of
mixing
the
tariffs
with
the
quotas is
called
tariff-rate
quotas.
The
U.S
department
of
Agriculture
announced
sugar
quotas
at
the
beginning
of
every
fiscal
season
year.
These
announcements
are
made
by
the
secretary
of
agriculture
and
are
kept
for
a year
until the
next
season
when
they
can be
adjusted
to
fit
the
sugar
production
level.
Quotas
and
subsidies
are
tabulated
together
to
determine
what
price
will
prevail
after
the implementation
of
such
policy.
Looking
at
demand
side
of
the
market,
one
would
find
quite
the
opposite
of
the
supply
side.
Determinants
of
sugar
demand
include
consumers’
taste
and
preference,
income,
price
of
substitute
goods,
number
of
buyers,
and
the
U.S
government’s
policies
such
as
taxes,
subsidies
and
quotas.
Demand
is
a very
important
component in
the market
structure
just
as
the
supply.
For
those
who
believe
in a market
system,
government
involvement
in
either
side
of
the
market
either
the
consumers
or
the
producers
side
causes
inefficiency
in
both
sides.
Subsidization in
general
is
supposed
to
help
consumers
by
making
sugar
cheaper
in
theory
because
producers
are
getting
money from
the
government.
The
subsidies
will make
suppliers
produce
more,
therefore
increasing
supply
by
shifting
the
supply
curve
outward
as
shown
on in
graph
# 1.
The
increase
in
quantity
supplied
would
cause
prices
to
fall
and
consumers
would
buy
more.
The
scenario
described
above
does
not
prevail
or
hold
in
the
U.S
sugar
industry,
at
least
the
price
falling
part.
Although
suppliers
will
produce
more,
consumers
do
not
reap
the
benefits
because
as
stated
earlier
surplus
does
not
hit
the
market
to
help
lower
the
price.
This
surplus
is
bought
and kept by
the
government
to
maintain
the
promise
that
guaranteed
prices
for sugar
farmers
in
the
U.S.
or
else
the
processors
will
forfeit
sugar
to
the
government
to
pay
repay
their
loan.
Imposing
tariff-rate
quotas
on
the
incoming
sugar
automatically
keep
prices
high
because
consumers
are
limited
in
terms
of
how much
sugar
they can
buy
from
outside.
U.S government
make
sure
that
the
amount
of
sugar
allowed
into
the
United
States
market
is
not
too much
to
alter
prices
that
were
pre-determined
earlier
at
the
beginning
of
the
season.
The
tariff-rate
quota
system
has
been
successful
as
reflected
in
historic
prices
for United
States’
sugar that
are
from
two
to
four
times
the
price
of
sugar
in
the
world
market
(Markheim
pg.
2).
|
| Year |
World
Prices for refined Sugar in U.S
cents/lbs |
United
States prices for refined
sugar
in U.S cents/lbs |
| 1995 |
17.94 |
39.67 |
| 1996 |
17.41 |
41.15 |
| 1997 |
14.48 |
43.25 |
| 1998 |
12.36 |
43.08 |
| 1999 |
9.81 |
43.14 |
| 2000 |
9.10 |
42.73 |
| 2001 |
11.35 |
43.10 |
| 2002 |
10.59 |
43.42 |
| 2003 |
10.06 |
42.73 |
| 2004 |
10.25 |
42.48 |
| 2005 |
12.47 |
43.06 |
Source: USDA Economic Research Services http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/Data.htm
|
These high prices are good for the U.S. sugar industry and particularly the domestic producers but not good for American consumers who pay more than the world prevailing sugar price for their daily sugar use. The money lost in this trade by the consumers would have otherwise gone to another industry or been saved, or best used to invest in education.
The high prices are also not good for any American business that must purchase overpriced sugar for use in production of its own goods especially the soft drinks companies, bakeries, and any other high volume users of sugar. The highly priced sugar in the United States not only becomes a burden on regular consumers but also the manufacturers as well (see prices comparison in graph # 4). Inflated sugar prices also erode the competitiveness of the sugar-using industry because it must charge higher prices for its own goods to cover excessive production costs. This effect results in the spillover cost of protecting the sugar industry.
The U.S government allows the producers in the sugar industry to charge high sugar prices and control outside sugar because of different labor cost associated with different countries such as wage differences. Wages in countries like Brazil are so low compared to the wages in United States. Brazil has a comparative advantage in terms of wage compensation for laborers who work on the farm. To ensure that the lower world sugar price due to cheap labor in countries like Brazil do not distort sugar prices in the United States, the U.S government must put in place a policy deem protective of the domestic farmers
Challenges facing the U.S sugar policy
|
There are number of challenges that face the U.S in their sugar policy. They include World Trade Organization, trade agreements, and politics. The recent rounds of talks in the World Trade Organization charter have been focused on the lowering trade barriers and encouraging global trade. It makes United State look like hypocrite to emphasize the important of international trade and at the same time hinders trade. The third world especially countries were United States do not apply preferential trade arrangements, complain that the support programs given to the agricultural products including commodities like sugar is unfair and should not be allowed. The farmers from these countries do not enjoy the same privileges that their counterparts in the United States enjoy, because their governments are often weak and cannot afford to subsidizedomestic farming. These countries are the price takers of the world price
Another big challenge facing the United States in their sugar policy is the issue of free trade agreement; there are several trade agreements in which the United States has participated. These agreements include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Before the adoption of the agreement, the proponent of such policy persuaded the public that the agreement would produce real economic benefits, including increase in employment in the United States and increase in productivity. What is interesting is the fact that sugar was some how exempted from this agreement although free trade was deemed positive for the welfare of the United States and its neighbors; Ironically the government pushed for this agreement claiming that it would also make Mexico a good neighbor politically and turn around then hold on to the traditional ways when it came to sugar industry. There was an exchange of a side-letter agreement that changed key sugar provisions of NAFTA.
The agreement stipulates that projected Mexican sugar production would have to exceed Mexico's consumption of both sugar and HFCS for Mexico to be considered a net surplus producer. For the first 6 years of NAFTA, Mexico was entitled to duty-free access for sugar exports to the United States in the amount of its projected net surplus production, up to a
maximum of 25,000 metric tons (Swartz and Bonello) If Mexico was not a net surplus producer, it still would have duty-free access for 7,258 metric tons (USDA). During fiscal years 2001-07, Mexico will have duty-free access to the U.S. market for the amount of its surplus as measured by the formula, up to a maximum of 250,000 metric tons (USDA).
Part IV. Conclusion
Cost of trade barrier and protectionism are high both for country that support them and the country that are denied the access to the market. Much like the EU, the U.S. is constrained on what agricultural product market to not control heavily, luckily, the sugar producers are among the protected one. While U.S. agricultural subsidies differ in both size and scope from the EU Common Agriculture Policy, they are both well funded, solidly entrenched by protectionist interests that equally protect them. Real and significant cuts in U.S. domestic programs, as called for by other WTO members, would be extremely difficult to push through Congress, especially without extensive commitments by other countries to reduce their own barriers in commodities that United States deem important.
For consumers, global barriers to trade in agricultural products such as sugar automatically keeps domestic prices high for food that involve sugar products. This raises the cost of living for families. According to a 2004 OECD study, U.S. farm programs resulted in higher food prices and caused the transfer of more than $16 billion from American households to domestic farmers over and above what the farmers received from direct government assistance. As one can see above, when the government is supporting high domestic prices, it is robbing “John to pay Peter” John being the American consumers and Peter being the domestic producers.
Barriers to sugar industry in the United States also depress world prices of sugar in other part of the world, impacting farmers in developing countries. William Cline of the Institute for International Economics has estimated that by removing trade barriers, developed countries could convey economic benefits to developing countries that are worth about twice the amount of annual aid transfers (Cline). In administering subsidies or support program to sugar farmers, infancy is used sometime as the argument, which implies that small farmers who are starting out are primarily supported heavily, compared to big ones. Contrary to the perceptions that support goes only to small, lowincome farmers, is the fact that large, high-income farms are increasingly the beneficiaries of U.S. support programs. A recent report found that both the number and market dominance of large farms (those with sales of at least $500,000) grew significantly between 1989 and 2003. At the same time, the number of small farms (those with sales between $10,000 and $250,000) fell from 40 percent of all farms in 1989 to 26 percent in 2003 (Drusilla, Alan and Robert)
Liberal trade enables more goods such as sugar to reach American consumers at lower prices, giving families more to save or spend on other goods and services. Moreover, the benefits of free trade extend well beyond American households. Free trade fosters economic development in poor countries. Because today’s global economy offers unparalleled opportunities for the U.S., it is in America's economic interest to continue to expand trade by lowering barriers to trade in goods such as sugar. The unprotective policies would create a level of competition in today's open market that leads to innovation and better products, higher-paying jobs, new markets, and increased savings and investment. This research was very hard for me because sugar industry is a very complicated industry in the United States. There are different ways of getting sugar, sugar cane, sugar beets, and other sweeteners. In the analysis of this paper, I have maintained that all these different types of sugar are classified into one industry. I was not interested in analyzing a particular sugar source but rather the policy that government the United States sugar industry.
Works consulted
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Knight
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